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aranda ODonnell was 
driving to her moth-
er’s house to pick up her 
four-year-old daughter 
when she was stopped by police and 
arrested for driving with a suspended 
license. As was the practice in many 
counties, Harris County judges at the 
time set bail according to a fixed cash 
bail schedule, with no regard to abil-
ity to pay or whether a person posed 
a public safety or flight risk. A judge 
set ODonnell’s bail at $2,500.1 Like tens 
of thousands of others, she could not 
afford to make bail and was detained 
in jail. If she’d had access to the $250 
(nonrefundable) fee that a bondsman 
would typically charge, she would have 
been released within a few hours, like 
so many people of means. As a poor 
person, however, she remained locked 
up solely on account of her poverty. 
She could not buy her release from jail.
Just like ODonnell, who joined with 
other plaintiffs to challenge the Harris 
County bail system in federal court, 
people across the country face bail 
systems that have operated in a sim-
ilarly unfair fashion. For people with 
the means to pay money bail (or to 
pay ten percent of the bail as a non-
refundable fee to a bail bondsman), an 
arrest has minimal disruptive effect on 
their lives. Within hours of an arrest, 
a person with money can walk out of 
jail and return to her job or to care for 
her children. The trauma and danger 
of time spent in jail is also minimal. 
But for the poor person, an arrest for 
a minor crime can have devastating 
effects. Those effects are heightened 
during and after COVID-19, as jails 
have become some of the nation’s larg-
est epicenters of the pandemic.
We have now served for one-and-a-
half years as court-appointed monitors 
in the ODonnell case. We write to 
describe the litigation and to offer 
our perspective on how the misde-
meanor bail system in Harris County 
has changed since that litigation 
began.2 The ODonnell Consent Decree 
that resulted from the lawsuit has the 
potential to set an important model for 
pretrial reform. We describe what that 
consent decree provides and the work 
to come.
THE MISDEMEANOR  
BAIL REFORM LAWSUIT  
IN HARRIS COUNTY
In 2016, ODonnell and other plaintiffs 
charged with misdemeanors brought 
a federal class action against Harris 
County and moved for a preliminary 
injunction to end the practices that 
led to these detentions. The complaint 
noted that, on a typical night, 500 peo-
ple arrested for misdemeanors were 
detained in the Harris County jail,3 
and that, between 2009 and 2015, 55 
people who could not afford bail died 
in Harris County jail while awaiting 
trial.4 It bears reiterating that these 
people were not in jail serving a sen-
tence after being convicted of a crime 
— they were merely accused of mis-
demeanor offenses and awaiting their 
day in court.
At the time ODonnell filed the law-
suit, arrestees in Harris County 
appeared before magistrates without 
the assistance of attorneys to speak on 
their behalf. Nor were they allowed to 
speak in their own defense. They were 
not informed of their rights. In hear- u
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ings that typically lasted for a minute 
or two, magistrates almost invariably 
set monetary bail amounts according 
to a fixed bail schedule, without regard 
to a person’s ability to pay.5 People like 
ODonnell, who were too poor to post 
a financial bond, languished in the 
Harris County jail. And studies show 
that holding low-risk people in jail, 
even for just a day or two, significantly 
increased their likelihood of commit-
ting another crime after release.6 The 
system made the public less safe by 
needlessly locking up poor people. 
The unfairness of the Harris County 
misdemeanor bail practices also exac-
erbated racial disparities in the Harris 
County jail population. As the fed-
eral district court found, a 2011 study 
showed that in Harris County, 70 per-
cent of white misdemeanor arrestees 
obtained early pretrial release from 
detention, but only 52 percent of 
Latino misdemeanor arrestees and 45 
percent of African American misde-
meanor arrestees did.7
While convictions for nonviolent 
drug offenses have driven mass incar-
ceration in federal and state prisons, 
the money bail system has driven it in 
county jails, wasting taxpayer dollars 
to lock up the poor and, disproportion-
ately, racial minorities, for no reason 
other than their inability to pay. Chief 
Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, of the United 
States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas, relied on a com-
prehensive set of factual findings in 
concluding that “Harris County’s [bail] 
policy and practice violates the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of 
the United States Constitution.”8 
THE ODONNELL CONSENT 
DECREE
After three years of litigation, includ-
ing an appeal to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the par-
ties reached a settlement resulting in 
a landmark consent decree, approved 
on Nov. 21, 2019.9 The ODonnell con-
sent decree represents the first federal 
court–supervised remedy governing 
bail. It sets forth a blueprint for cre-
ating a constitutional and transparent 
pretrial system to protect the due pro-
cess and equal protection rights of 
misdemeanor arrestees. The terms of 
the decree envision transformative, 
lasting change.10 
First, the decree sets out catego-
ries of arrestees who are entitled 
to a prompt release. It incorporates 
the new Amended Local Rule 9 of 
the Harris County Criminal Courts at 
Law,11 which had been adopted by the 
county criminal court judges — many 
of whom had won their first elec-
tions as judges running on campaign 
promises to improve the bail system.12 
The rule rescinded the prior secured 
money bail schedule, provided for a 
new set of procedures, and required 
the prompt release of misdemeanor 
arrestees, except for six “carve-
out” categories of offenses. Persons 
arrested for misdemeanors that do 
not fall within the six categories of 
carve-out offenses must be promptly 
released under a personal bond or 
a General Order Bond.13 Persons 
arrested for the six types of carve-out 
offenses must receive a hearing. 
Second, the decree requires far more 
robust procedural protections at mis-
demeanor bail hearings, mandating 
that judges make their findings “by 
clear and convincing evidence” that 
the arrestee has the ability to pay the 
amount required, or does not have 
that ability to pay but that “no less-re-
strictive condition or combination of 
conditions” could “reasonably” prevent 
flight from prosecution and protect 
the safety of the community. 
A hearing officer now must explain 
to an arrestee:
I cannot order that you be detained 
or require you to pay an unafford-
able amount of money bail as a 
condition of release unless I make 
a finding by clear and convincing 
evidence that no other condition or 
combination of conditions is ade-
quate to reasonably assure public 
safety or to reasonably protect 
against flight from prosecution.
Further, a hearing officer must explain:
I must identify and explain the 
reasons for my decision and the 
evidence and information I relied 
on in making that decision on 
the record, so that you can chal-
lenge the decision at a later date. 
Requiring unaffordable money 
bail or ordering you detained must 
be the last resort, and I will order 
detention after this hearing only if 
I make a finding that there are no 
alternatives for reasonably assur-
Studies show that 
holding low-risk 
people in jail, even 
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ing the safety of the community 
and reasonably protecting against 
your flight from prosecution.
That requirement reflects the con-
stitutional standard, drawing on the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in United 
States v. Salerno, which held that pre-
trial detention was permissible under 
the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 
only where the government provided 
a robust, adversarial, on-the-record 
hearing and a judge made a finding 
by clear and convincing evidence that 
detention was necessary.14 It is also 
consistent with prior cases that held 
that, under the Due Process Clause, 
when the government seeks to detain 
a person presumed innocent and not 
yet convicted of any crime, and seeks 
to deprive that person of liberty, it 
must do so only based on a strong evi-
dentiary showing. 
Importantly, the decree provides 
that all persons charged with misde-
meanors are guaranteed the right to 
a public defender or other counsel at 
a bail hearing, and that such coun-
sel shall have access to the client and 
the discovery needed to prepare for 
the bail hearings.15 Harris County has 
now implemented a system for elec-
tronic discovery to ensure that counsel 
has the documents needed to prepare 
before the hearings.
The decree provides that a person is 
“indigent,” and cannot be assessed any 
fees associated with bond or condi-
tions of release, if that person lacks the 
ability to pay any amount of secured 
bail and if they struggle to meet basic 
necessities. “Indigency” includes indi-
viduals who are deemed indigent 
under indigent defense guidelines; 
who are homeless; who themselves 
or whose dependents receive public 
assistance; whose household income 
does not exceed 200 percent of the 
federal poverty guidelines; and who 
are currently incarcerated.16
Third, following this pretrial stage, 
the decree provides for improved pro-
cedures upon release, including an 
improved approach towards sched-
uling and notifying people regarding 
court appearances. People who have 
misdemeanor cases now benefit from 
a clear and consistent court appear-
ance policy, which sets forth options 
for waiving or rescheduling appear-
ances. Further, Harris County is now 
implementing a new court notification 
system, studying the causes of nonap-
pearance, and conducting trainings on 
the decree policies. Harris County has 
retained the National Association for 
Public Defense to study and suggest 
improvements in standards for indi-
gent defense in misdemeanor cases. 
Fourth, the decree provides that 
robust data will be made available, 
including information on misdemeanor 
pretrial release and detention deci-
sions, demographic and socioeconomic 
information on each misdemeanor 
arrestee, and also historical data dat-
ing back to 2009.17 The decree provides 
for public meetings and input, county 
reports published every 60 days, and 
online information regarding imple-
mentation of the decree.18
Finally, the decree calls for a moni-
tor tasked with a set of responsibilities 
to evaluate decree compliance and 
to approve a range of decisions to be 
made as the decree is implemented. 
On March 3, 2020, we were honored to 
be appointed to serve as the monitors 
for the consent decree. We have since 
provided two reports to Chief Judge 
Rosenthal at the conclusion of each 
six-month period during our work. 
Here, we provide an overview of our 
work and of our findings during our 
first year.19
OUR MONITORING WORK
Implementing the Consent Decree
The principal task of this monitorship 
is to report to the court as we oversee 
and support the Harris County officials 
who are implementing a new pretrial 
justice system. The goals of that sys-
tem are to restore the public’s trust, 
safeguard constitutional rights, and in 
fact accomplish the twin aims of bail: to 
keep the community safe and promote 
the integrity of the judicial proceed-
ings by preventing people from fleeing 
justice. Thus, as the decree summa-
rizes in its introduction, the decree “is 
intended to create and enforce con-
stitutional and transparent pretrial 
practices and systems that protect due 
process rights and equal protection 
rights of misdemeanor arrestees.”20
The entire first year of our work 
was marked by the COVID-19 pan-
demic, which has upended all of our 
lives. The pandemic has added a new 
deadly risk for people detained in a 
custodial facility. The first COVID-19 
case was reported in the Harris County 
Joint Processing Center on March 29, 
2020, shortly after our appointment as 
monitors. The Harris County Sheriff’s 
Office (HCSO) adopted a range of pre-
cautions in response to the pandemic. 
Nevertheless, the sheriff reported 
on Jan. 12, 2021, that the “jail is burst-
ing at the seams,” and “new inmates 
who test positive have no place to 
quarantine because the surveillance 
tank is full and the general popula-
tion is grid-locked.” Additionally, “[s]ix 
inmates and two HCSO staff members 
have died from the virus.”21 The HCSO 
administered over 25,000 COVID-19 
tests. From March 29, 2020, through 
January 2021, a total of 1,558 COVID-19 
positive inmates were released from 
the jail, of which 49 were charged with 
misdemeanors only, and of which 1,115 
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were charged with a misdemeanor and 
a felony offense. As of Jan. 27, 2021, of 
the 1,082 COVID-19 positive persons 
in the jail, 12 persons were COVID-
19 positive and charged solely with a 
misdemeanor. An additional 286 were 
charged with a misdemeanor and a fel-
ony offense.22
Despite the crisis posed by COVID-
19, which has meant that many county 
administrators have been working 
remotely, remarkable progress has 
already been made as a result of Rule 9 
and the consent decree. A new system 
of electronic discovery was created to 
provide information to defense coun-
sel prior to bail hearings; new court 
appearance rules have been imple-
mented (with court appearances and 
setting types captured beginning Dec. 
5, 2020); and trainings on the misde-
meanor bail process have begun (on 
Dec. 11, 2020). In addition, a new misde-
meanor pretrial-disposition form that 
better reflects the consent decree pro-
cess was adopted and implemented by 
criminal court judges.
Empirical Findings
In Harris County, secured money bonds 
are no longer required for most mis-
demeanor cases under Rule 9. Most 
people are released promptly without a 
hearing. As a result, the number of mis-
demeanor arrestees who are released 
has dramatically increased, and the 
reliance on cash bail for and deten-
tion of those who lack the resources to 
make bail has dramatically decreased. 
For example, we find that in recent 
years a larger proportion of persons 
arreseted for misdemeanors have been 
released from jail either on the same 
day or one day after being booked into 
jail. In more than 80 percent of the 
cases since 2017, people arrested for 
misdemeanors spent two days or fewer 
in jail before their release (80 percent 
in 2017, 82 percent in 2018, 85 percent 
in 2019, and 86 percent in 2020). The 
largest reductions in the length of pre-
trial detention are observed in 2017 and 
2019, the years when the ODonnell pre-
liminary injunction and Rule 9 became 
effective, respectively.
The reforms likely had an important 
impact on the types of bonds approved 
for misdemeanor arrestees, substan-
tially reducing arrestees’ financial 
burdens. Prior to the implementation of 
Rule 9 in 2019, most misdemeanor cases 
did not involve a personal or General 
Order Bond. This meant that most peo-
ple were held on secured bonds, so that 
they could not obtain release unless 
they had the money to pay a fee to a 
bail bondsperson. In 2015, virtually 
every misdemeanor case (92 percent) 
had a secured money bond set. In 2020, 
that share was down to just 14 percent. 
Most people, therefore, did not have to 
pay cash up front to obtain a release in 
a misdemeanor case. As a result, there 
has been a stunning drop in the cost of 
bonds set by the courts since the imple-
mentation of Rule 9, from $135 million 
in 2015 to $13 million in 2020 — one-
tenth of the previous amount.
These reforms have resulted in far 
more people released to the commu-
nity, who would otherwise have been 
jailed based on inability to pay, and they 
have also benefited public safety. The 
rate of repeat offending has remained 
largely stable — and appears even 
to have slightly declined. We have 
observed, in general, slightly declin-
ing rates of individual people arrested 
for misdemeanors who repeat-offend 
in each year from 2015 to 2019 (from 
23.4 percent in 2015 to 20.5 percent in 
2019). Recall that the misdemeanor bail 
reforms took effect in early 2019. We do 
observe a slight increase in the share of 
misdemeanor cases that are followed 
by a new felony case (from 10.7 percent 
in 2015 to 11.4 percent in 2019). Nor did 
the number of “frequent flyers” change. 
Only about one percent of the people 
arrested for a misdemeanor offense in 
2019 were re-arrested on four or more 
separate occasions within 365 days, a 
rate that has not substantially changed 
from 2015 to 2019. We also observe that 
people arrested who had mental-health 
flags and who were recorded as home-
less were about twice as likely to be 
re-arrested than other people arrested. 
We are concerned that so many persons 
in vulnerable populations cycle through 
the misdemeanor system and are con-
tinuing to study that problem.
Previously, the share of Black arrest-
ees who bonded out (through either 
cash or personal bonds) was much 
lower than white arrestees, especially 
in 2015 and 2016. But since the adoption 
of Rule 9 in early 2019, this dispar-
ity has almost entirely disappeared. A 
gender gap, with female persons more 
likely to bond out in earlier years, has 
also gradually declined over time. We 
have seen little change from 2015 to 
2019 in the sex and racial distribution 
of misdemeanor arrestees, but we have 
seen a gradual increase in the share of 
Latinx misdemeanor arrestees.
Much of the central architecture 
of misdemeanor bail reform is now 
in place. However, important work 
remains as we assist county officials in 
reaching their goal to build a model sys-
tem for misdemeanor pretrial justice. 
Implementation of a range of policies 
will occur in the months ahead, includ-
ing court appearance notification and 
scheduling options, indigent defense 
planning, and ongoing training. Also 
forthcoming are a series of additional 
data analyses, including regarding 
court appearances, merits outcomes, 
and further analysis of recidivism 
outcomes, together with feedback 
on Harris County’s work creating a 
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fully functional data portal for misde-
meanor cases. We continue to conduct 
cost-benefit analyses of this bail reform 
undertaking in Harris County.
Bail Reform in Harris County, 
Texas, and Nationally
Ironically, although Harris County has 
experienced excellent early results in 
transforming its misdemeanor bail 
system, some local law enforcement 
officials have expressed dismay at the 
changes, pointing to examples of indi-
viduals who committed murders while 
out on personal bonds or on low money 
bonds after an arrest for a prior violent 
crime.23 We note that homicides and 
shootings have gone up in a wide range 
of jurisdictions across the country. At 
the same time, in Harris County, as in 
many other jurisdictions nationwide, a 
wide range of crimes, including other 
violent crimes like simple assault, have 
also declined during the pandemic.24 
These patterns during the pandemic 
year will no doubt be much studied 
by criminologists. One thing is clear: 
The national spike in firearms violence 
cannot likely be attributed to any par-
ticular localities’ practices or policies.
Some elected officials have made dis-
paraging statements about the new 
bail system, which has made it more 
difficult for us as monitors to help 
the community understand that the 
changes brought about under the con-
sent decree have clearly produced 
positive results. What detractors of 
the new bail system seem to misun-
derstand is this: The consent decree 
applies only to misdemeanor cases. For 
people charged with serious violent 
crimes in felony cases, there has been 
no “bail reform.” Further, under the 
consent decree, individuals charged 
with specific categories of serious 
misdemeanors are not automatically 
entitled to release on personal bonds. 
Serious misdemeanor cases (as is gen-
erally also true in felony cases) must 
have bail decided at hearings before 
magistrates who have the full panoply 
of options that have always been avail-
able: personal bonds, secured financial 
bonds, and other conditions of release 
such as protective orders, GPS moni-
toring, and the like. For those serious 
misdemeanor cases, judges have the 
authority to require secured finan-
cial bonds at whatever amount they 
deem appropriate. Indeed, the consent 
decree actually addresses the dangers 
of a cash bail system, whereby individ-
uals who pose a public safety threat can 
nevertheless pay to make a cash bond, 
obtain release, and then proceed to 
re-offend. Thus, the complaints about 
“bail reform” are misplaced, and are 
really complaints about recent deci-
sions made by magistrates and judges 
in setting bail under the same cash-bail 
oriented rules that have existed for 
many years. 
At the state level, the concerns 
expressed regarding bail have spurred 
the Texas Governor to make fixing the 
state’s “broken bail system” a major 
priority for the current legislative 
session.25 Presently, Texas legislators 
are considering two bills that would 
reform the bail system in dramatically 
different ways. One bill would reduce 
the state’s reliance on financial bonds 
and move the state toward risk-based 
bail determination, utilizing validated 
risk-assessment instruments and disal-
lowing fixed bail schedules. At the same 
time, this bill would broaden preven-
tive detention by increasing the list of 
charges for which bail can be denied, as 
well as disallowing personal bonds for 
a broader list of more serious charges.26
By contrast, the other bill would 
instead explicitly allow the use of fixed 
bail schedules, eliminate the authority 
of magistrates to issue personal bonds 
to most people, and make it hard for 
charity bail organizations to operate 
in the state.27 This bill would require 
pretrial hearings for large numbers of 
persons across Texas, who under cur-
rent court rules would be eligible for 
prompt release. This bill would have 
the effect of moving the state toward 
a broader use of secured financial 
bonds across the board. If adopted, this 
bill would impose enormous costs on 
hearing officers, judges, and local gov-
ernments. The bill would also conflict 
with some of the terms of the ODonnell 
Consent Decree. Concerns about this 
conflict have motivated the Harris 
County Commissioners Court to vote 
(along party lines) to condemn the bill.28 
The County’s Justice Administration 
Department has testified against the 
bill, positing that the bill could “expos[e] 
Harris County to costly litigation” and 
These reforms 
have resulted in 
far more people 
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noting that the ODonnell litigation has 
already “cost Harris County taxpayers 
$60-$100 million.”29 
It remains to be seen, as of this 
writing, whether the state will adopt 
legislation that will pose a conflict with 
the rules required under the federal 
consent decree. Regardless of what 
legislation the Texas legislature may 
adopt, we expect that Harris County 
will continue to follow the criminal 
court rules for misdemeanor bail as 
required under the consent decree. But 
we watch with concern as the legisla-
tion moves forward.
There are lessons to be learned na- 
tionally from the Harris County expe-
rience. Indeed, other jurisdictions 
have looked to the ODonnell Consent 
Decree when considering how to 
improve their own pretrial systems, 
or they have adopted similar models 
for similar reasons. In February 2021, 
Illinois lawmakers adopted a statewide 
reform, titled the “Illinois Pre-Trial 
Fairness Act,” as part of a package of 
criminal justice measures. The statute 
adopts the same standard set out in the 
ODonnell consent decree, the Salerno 
rule that: “All defendants shall be pre-
sumed eligible for pretrial release, and 
the State shall bear the burden of prov-
ing by clear and convincing evidence” 
that the person poses a specific public 
safety threat or a flight risk.30 Further, 
prior to pretrial hearings, the state 
must provide discovery, including cop-
ies of the person’s criminal history 
and any statements by the defendant 
to be relied on by the state, as well as 
any police reports. A person has the 
right to counsel at such hearings. The 
Illinois approach very much follows 
the approach adopted in this consent 
decree, and it will be implemented over 
the next two years. 
We also note that the constitutional 
approach underlying the ODonnell con-
sent decree has recently been cited by 
the California Supreme Court in a sim-
ilar case.31 In its ruling, the California 
court found a due process violation in 
the use of money bail without taking 
into account the defendant’s ability to 
pay and without considering whether 
less-restrictive alternatives could ade-
quately protect the public, the victim, 
and ensure a person’s appearance in 
court.32 Further, a preliminary consent 
judgment in a civil rights case brought 
in Alamance County, North Carolina, 
has also adopted key elements mir-
roring the ODonnell Consent Decree’s 
approach, including the use of a Salerno 
standard.33 
Of course, the ODonnell Consent 
Decree itself reflects preexisting mod-
els. For example, the American Bar 
Association has recommended since 
1998 that counsel be present at all bail 
hearings, and in 2007 recommended 
a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard for pretrial decision-making.34 
It is noteworthy, however, that these 
recommendations are only recently 
being implemented in a comprehen-
sive way in large jurisdictions. 
CONCLUSION
In sum, the misdemeanor bail system 
in Harris County has already under-
gone a remarkable transition. This 
model includes a broad set of categor-
ical entitlements to release, far more 
robust hearing procedures, and sup-
portive services upon release. The 
empirical findings after the first year 
of monitoring show positive trends: 
more arrestees released pretrial with-
out financial conditions attached, a 
stable or slightly reduced rate of reof-
fending by those released pretrial, and 
a reduction in the racial and gender 
disparities in pretrial releases. We are 
grateful for the opportunity to serve as 
court-appointed monitors as this trans-
formation continues in the years ahead. 
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